Our choice is influenced by choices we made in the past, but the mechanism responsible for the choice bias remains elusive. Here we show that the history-dependent choice bias can be explained by an autonomous learning rule whereby an estimate of the likelihood of a choice to be made is updated in each trial by comparing between the actual and expected choices. We found that in perceptual decision making without performance feedback, a decision on an ambiguous stimulus is repeated on the subsequent trial more often than a decision on a salient stimulus. This inertia of decision was not accounted for by biases in motor response, sensory processing, or attention. The posterior cingulate cortex and frontal eye field represent choice prediction error and choice estimate in the learning algorithm, respectively. Interactions between the two regions during the intertrial interval are associated with decision inertia on a subsequent trial.
INTRODUCTION
Our choice behavior is influenced by the history of choices and the contexts under which the choices have been made. When reward or performance feedback is given for each trial, the choice behavior is modulated by the history of reward or error feedback, and we learn to make an optimal choice given a sensory context . The trial history effect, however, can also be observed when no feedback is given or when we know that a decision should be made independently on each occasion (Bertelson, 1965; Soetens, 1998; Fecteau and Munoz, 2003; Gold et al., 2008; Kristjá nsson and Campana, 2010; Marcos et al., 2013) . The bias in choice behavior is thought to be due to internal signals that emerge from memories acquired through prior experiences with the sensory environment as well as memories of past choices. In perceptual decision making, these internal signals are thought to interact with externally provided sensory signals and bias the decision about the sensory stimulus (Albright, 2012; Awh et al., 2012; Carnevale et al., 2012) . It has also been shown that fluctuation of neural activity in the frontal and parietal areas is predictive of subsequent decision on an ambiguous stimulus (Williams et al., 2003; de Lafuente and Romo, 2005; Carnevale et al., 2012) .
It remains open, however, how choices and sensory events in the trial history contribute to the fluctuation of the internal signals that bias decisions. This is partly because it is difficult to tease apart multiple factors that could contribute to the internal bias signals, such as sensory, motor, and choice processes. If the internal signals are due to a residual of the sensory signals in the previous trials, the decision-biasing effect is expected to be larger when a salient stimulus has been presented because the stimulus elicits a larger neural response in sensory areas and thus should leave a larger trace in the neural circuits. Alternatively, if the internal signals are due to a residual of the motor response-related signals, the biasing effect can be observed independent of the stimulus saliency. Contrary to these expectations, we found that a decision made on an ambiguous stimulus was more often followed by repetition of the same decision on the subsequent trial, in comparison to a decision made on a salient stimulus.
The tendency of choice repetition has been treated as random process in studies of decision making Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Gold et al., 2008) . Through computational model fitting, simulation, and behavioral data analysis, we instead show that this inertia of decision is best accounted for by an autonomous learning rule to estimate the choice likelihood, which is updated for every trial with the following algorithm, CE n+1 = CE n + a(C n -CE n ). The crucial feature of this mechanism is that in the absence of performance feedback, the choice that has actually been made (C n ) serves as a feedback to update the choice estimate (CE n ). When little sensory evidence is available for making a decision, the choice is more likely to be made based on the estimate of the likely choice. According to the learning rule, the choice thus made updates the choice estimate toward the actual choice, and on the subsequent trial, the decision is biased in favor of the same decision as in the previous trial. Using fMRI as well as concurrent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and electroencephalography (EEG) recording, we show that the frontal eye field (FEF) represents the updated choice estimate (CE n+1 ) and medial parietal cortex/posterior cingulate cortex (mPC/CGp) represents choice-based prediction error signals (C n -CE n ). The results also suggest that the interaction between the two regions is involved in maintenance and updating of the internal signals responsible for the decision inertia.
RESULTS

Biasing Effect of Previous Choice on Ambiguous Stimulus
Normal human subjects performed a reaction-time (RT) version of a two-direction motion discrimination task (RT2 dir) (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) (Figure 1A ). Subjects indicated their decision about the direction of coherent motion in a random dot pattern with button press. No performance feedback was given in each trial. We found that on trials with zero motion coherence, subjects tended to repeat the same choice as in the previous trial. Moreover, this choice repetition probability was significantly higher when intermediate (6.4% and 12.8%) or low (0% and 3.2%) coherence motion was presented on the previous trial (prev-Mid and prev-Low) than when high (25.6% and 51.2%) coherence motion was presented on the previous trial (prev-High) (one-way ANOVA with factor of previous motion coherence [prev-Coh: prev-Low, -Mid, and -High] , Greenhouse-Geisser sphericity correction: epsilon (ε) = 0.79, F(1.58, 20.6) = 17.2, p < 0.01, post hoc Sidak test: p < 0.01) ( Figure 1B ).
To quantify the biasing effect of the previous choice and its changes depending on the coherence of motion stimulus in the previous trial, we performed binary logistic analysis on the choice repetition probability across all motion coherence levels ( Figure 1C ). Here the motion coherence level on the current trial was assigned a positive value when the direction of stimulus motion was the same as the motion direction indicated by the subject on the previous trial (previous choice direction) and was assigned a negative value when the current motion direction was opposite to the previous choice direction. As expected, the choice repetition probability increased when the motion direction was the same as the previous choice direction, more so with higher motion coherence in the current trial. Crucially we found that addition of motion coherence level of the previous trial as covariate significantly improved the fitting of the regression curve: compared to prev-High trials, the regression curve was significantly shifted leftward for prev-Mid and prev-Low trials, indicating an increase in the choice repetition probability (p = 0.019 and 0.001, respectively, for the subject shown in Figure 1C) . For 13 out of the 14 subjects tested, the odds ratio for the addition of previous motion coherence level as covariate (B) Choice repetition probability on trials with zero coherence motion. Mean and SEM (n = 14). prev-High, -Mid, and -Low: trials following high (coherence: 25.6% and 51.2%), intermediate (6.4% and 12.8%), and low (0% and 3.2%) coherence trials. *p < 0.01 by post hoc test.
(C) A single-subject data for choice repetition probability. Positive and negative signs of current motion coherence (abscissa) indicate same or opposite motion direction relative to the previous choice direction. Inset: odds ratio and 95% confidence interval for addition of the previous motion coherence level as a covariate. A value for prev-Mid (top) and prev-Low (bottom) as compared with prev-High is shown.
(D) Effect of previous error on choice repetition probability. Choice repetition probability on trials with zero coherence motion, following correct and error trials with intermediate coherence motion (prev-Correct and -Error). *p < 0.01 by paired t test. (E) Multitrial choice history effect. The plot shows the probability of choosing a given choice ''A'' after a sequence of choice, ''AA,'' ''AAA,'' ''AAAA,'' and ''AAAAA'' (X = A, shown in red) and that after a sequence of choice, ''AB,'' ''AAB,'' ''AAAB,'' and ''AAAAB'' (X = B, shown in black). The data are shown separately when the motion coherence in the immediately preceding trial is high (left) or low (right). See also Figure S1 .
was significantly larger than 1 (p < 0.05). Relative to prev-High, the mean leftward shift of the regression curve was equivalent to 5.62% (95% confidence interval: 4.08-7.16) and 5.26% (3.59-6.93) change in motion coherence for prev-Mid and prev-Low, respectively. The biasing effect was also observed in a delayed-response version of the task (DR2 dir) as well as in a four-direction motion discrimination task (RT4 dir) ( Figure S1 available online). We reasoned that the biasing effect is due to internal signals that persist across trials. If so, an erroneous decision should have a larger biasing effect than a correct decision: on error trials, strong internal signals are thought to have overridden the externally provided motion signals to the opposite direction. We indeed found an increase in the choice repetition probability after error trials compared to correct trials ( Figure 1D and Figure S1 ). Here we focused on trials with zero coherence motion, preceded by trials with intermediate coherence motion (prevMid) . The choice repetition probability increased significantly when subjects made errors in the previous trials compared to when subjects made correct decisions (paired t test, two-tailed, t(13) = 5.17, p < 0.01). Of note is that the subjects were not given feedback of their performance and yet erroneous decisions affected the choice on the next trial. This suggests that a mechanism associated with making an erroneous choice rather than recognition of an error is responsible for the decision inertia (see also Supplemental Analysis for the effect of RT in the previous trials).
Multitrial Choice History Effect
The result of the previous analysis indicates an effect of the immediately preceding trial. The choice-biasing effect, however, can be observed across multiple trials. We therefore compared the probability of choosing a given choice ''A'' (right or left) on a trial after a (n + 1)-trial sequence of the same choice (A(n + 1)) and that on a trial after a n-trial sequence of the same choice but with a different choice made on the immediately preceding trial (A(n)B). We conducted three-way ANOVA with factors of the number of choice repetition (n = 1 -4), choice of the immediately preceding trial (A or B), and motion coherence level on the immediately preceding trial (high or low). We found significant main effect of the number of choice repetition (ε = 0.61, F(1.84, 23.9) = 5.64, p = 0.011), which suggests an increase in the probability of choosing the choice that has been repeated in the preceding trials, more so as the number of choice repetitions increases ( Figure 1E ). We also found a significant interaction between choice repetition and last choice (ε = 0.71, F(2.14, 27.8) = 3.75, p = 0.034), suggesting that the effect of the last choice changes as a function of the number of choice repetition. As can be seen in the figure, the cumulative effect of the choice repetition in the previous trials (when the choice in the immediately preceding trial, X, is A) disappeared when a different choice was made in the last trial in the sequence (X = B). Importantly, the effect of the last choice significantly interacted with the motion coherence level of the last trial (F(1, 13) = 5.50, p = 0.036), indicating an increase in the effect of last choice when low coherence motion is presented on that trial, which is a characteristic of the decision-biasing effect that we report in the present study. The results suggest a multitrial mechanism for choice-biasing effects, which both maintains and updates the internal biases.
Nature of the Internal Signals
We also conducted a series of control experiments in order to tease apart the effect of the previous choice from other effects such as motor response bias, sensory bias, and attention. The internal signals responsible for the biasing effect can be the residual of an internally generated motor response for weak sensory signals (motor response bias). To test this possibility, we introduced a decision-response mapping cue and changed the relationship between a decision and motor response pseudorandomly across trials (DR2 dir-MAP; Figure 2A ). This design allowed us to dissociate a decision-biasing effect from a motor response bias. Two-way ANOVA on the decision repetition probability with factors of prev-Coh (prev-Low, -Mid, and -High) and mapping cue (repetition and switch) revealed a significant main effect of the previous coherence level as in RT2 dir (ε = 0.98, F(1.95, 19.5) = 8.28, p = 0.003) ( Figure 2B ). This pattern, however, was not modulated by the repetition or switch of the mapping cue (main effect of mapping cue: F(1, 10) = 0.73, p = 0.792; interaction between mapping cue and previous coherence: ε = 0.75, F(1.49, 14.9) = 0.126, p = 0.823). The decision repetition probability was significantly larger for prev-Mid and prev-Low than prev-High, regardless of whether the mapping cue was repeated or switched from the previous trial (post hoc test, p < 0.05 for all pairwise comparisons). This means that subjects tended to perceive the motion as moving toward the same direction as in the previous trial, even when they had to make a different motor response to report the motion direction. Thus, the motor response bias cannot account for the decision-biasing effect.
Another possibility is that the internal signals responsible for the biasing effect are due to an aftereffect of the sensory signals (sensory bias). The difference in choice repetition probability between prev-High and prev-Mid/Low could be due to visual adaptation to high coherence motion in the previous trial, which may bias perception away from the previous motion direction and thus decrease the choice repetition probability. To examine this possibility, we used RT2 dir task with continuous motion stimulus during intertrial interval (ITI) (RT2 dir-IVS, Figure 2C ). Throughout the ITI of 2,850 to 3,150 ms, subjects were shown a random dot pattern moving either to the left or right with coherence level of 51.2% (intervening visual stimulus, IVS) but were not asked to make a decision on the IVS. We still found a significant increase in choice repetition probability in prev-Mid and prev-Low relative to prev-High (two-way ANOVA with factors of prev-Coh and IVS direction, main effect of prev-Coh: ε = 0.88, F(1.77, 33.6) = 9.19, p = 0.001, post hoc test: p < 0.05) (Figure 2D) . Crucially, the IVS direction relative to the previous choice direction did not affect the choice repetition probability (F(1, 19) = 0.22, p = 0.64). Interaction between the IVS direction and previous motion coherence was not significant either (ε = 0.98, F(1.96, 37.3) = 1.35, p = 0.27). Thus, mere exposure to a salient motion stimulus did not bias the subsequent decision, suggesting that the choice-biasing effect is not due to an aftereffect of the sensory signals.
A third possibility is that the biasing effect is due to attentionrelated modulation in the sensitivity to the sensory signals (attention bias). Decision making on an ambiguous stimulus involves selective processing of a stimulus feature favoring one perceptual decision over the other, and the carryover of this biased processing may contribute to the choice repetition bias (Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1994) . To examine this possibility, we used RT2 dir task for overlaid random dot patterns with red and green colors (RT2 dir-Overlaid). Subjects indicated their decision about the coherent motion for one of the two colors indicated by a cue ( Figure 2E ). We found that a switch in the attended color did not affect the choice repetition probability (two-way ANOVA with factors of attention cue (repetition and switch) and prev-Coh, main effect of attention cue: F(1, 14) = 0.892; p = 0.361) ( Figure 2F ). An increase in choice repetition probability for prev-Low and -Mid relative to prev-High was observed regardless of whether the attention cue was repeated or switched from the previous trial (main effect of prev-Coh: ε = 0.90, F(1.79, 25.0) = 16.3, p < 0.001; interaction between attention cue and previous motion coherence: ε = 0.90, F(1.80, 25.2) = 0.037, p = 0.95; post hoc tests comparing between prev-Low and -High, and between prev-Mid and -High for repeat and switch: p < 0.05 for all). The result suggests that the choice bias effect we report here cannot be accounted for by carryover of attention (see also Figure S2 for further analysis of the data).
Model Fitting
We next conducted theoretical analysis to characterize the nature of the internal signals responsible for the decision inertia. The results of model fitting to the behavioral data also suggest that the decision inertia is not due to an effect on motor representations, to an aftereffect on sensory representations, or to a carry-over effect of attention. Compared to a model without a modulator variable that accounts for the previous motion coherence (Basic Model), the fitting performance was no better for the models in which the previous motion coherence modulates: (1) the sensitivity to motion signals in direction-nonselective or direction-selective manner (Models 1 and 2), (2) general choice bias (Model 3), (3) tendency of repeating the same choice as in the previous trial (Model 4), or (4) magnitude of the motion aftereffect (Model 5). The Bayesian information criteria (BIC) for Models 1-5 did not decrease from the BIC for Basic Model (Figure 3A and Figure S3 , see also Experimental Procedures and Supplemental Analysis). These models failed probably because they did not take into account the multitrial choice history effect.
We therefore tested models in which a choice is biased by an internal estimate of the sensory signals to be presented (Model 6) or by an estimate of the likely choice to be made (Model 7). In Model 6, an estimate of the probable sensory signals at nth trial, SE n , is updated by adding a product of a learning rate parameter, a, and the difference between the actual sensory signals (M n ) and sensory estimate (SE n ) as in the equation, SE n + 1 = SE n + aðM n À SE n Þ. Here the prediction about the sensory state is updated in a reinforcement learning (RL)-like mechanism, although sensory signals (motion direction and coherence) presented for each trial are independent of each other. The model, however, did not improve the fitting relative to Basic Model ( Figure 3A and Figure S3 ). This is reasonable because when low coherence motion is presented (small M n ), an estimate of the sensory signals (SE n ) is updated to a smaller value, and the biasing effect on subsequent trials is expected to become smaller, which is contrary to the behavioral data that we have obtained.
In Model 7, by contrast, an estimate of the likely choice is updated by the choice itself. An estimate of the probable choice, CE n , is assumed to be updated based on the difference from (E) Two-direction motion discrimination task for overlaid two-color random dot patterns (DR2 dir-Overlaid). Red and green dots are presented in the experiment.
(F) Choice repetition probability, separately shown for trials in which an attention cue was repeated or switched from the previous trial. Mean and SEM (n = 15). *p < 0.05 by post hoc test. See also Figure S2 .
the choice that has actually been made (C n ) as in the equation,
Of note is that in the present study, no reward or performance feedback was presented for each trial, and an actual choice is used in the place of feedback. This differs from a standard RL mechanism in which choice (action) value is updated based on the difference from the outcome such as reward or performance feedback. There is, however, a hint that the actual choice itself may induce a change in choice likelihood. When choosing between items with a similar preference rating, a chosen item is rated higher while a rejected item is rated lower on the second time of preference rating, so-called choice-induced preference change (Brehm, 1956; Izuma and Murayama, 2013 ). An increase in the preference rating for a chosen item would lead to an increase in the probability of choosing the same item on the next occasion. We found that this error-based choice estimate model outperformed the Basic Model as well as other models ( Figure 3A and Figure S3 ). How then does this error-based choice estimation model explain an increase in the choice repetition probability on trials after low coherence motion and multitrial history effect? Decision is thought to be made based on the sum of the external sensory signals multiplied with a sensory gain parameter and internal bias signals, which in this model corresponds to a choice estimate (CE n ). When a decision is made on weak sensory signals at trial n, contribution of the choice estimate to the decision variable is large, and a choice tends to be made to the direction consistent with the choice estimate (i.e., C n and CE n have the same sign). The actual choice thus made (C n ) is more likely to update the internal choice estimate toward a value of the actual choice (i.e., CE n+1 becomes closer to C n ; note that C n takes a value of either 1 or À1, whereas CE n takes any value between À1 and 1; see Experimental Procedures for detail). The choice estimate thus updated (CE n+1 ) biases the subsequent decision (C n+1 ) toward the same direction as in the previous choice (C n ). Considering that the mean of the learning rate parameter of the model, a, was 0.39 (95% confidence interval: 0.18-0.68) (Table S1 ), such increment of choice repetition probability can be observed across several trials without reaching a ceiling. The behavioral data of multitrial choice history effect are consistent with the prediction ( Figure 1E ). (B) Simulation data for the effect of previous motion coherence. Choice repetition probability on zero coherence motion trials are plotted separately for prev-High, prev-Mid, and prev-Low. Mean and SEM (n = 14). *p < 0.05 by post hoc test. (C) Simulation data for the effect of previous error. Choice repetition probability on zero coherence motion trials are plotted separately for trials preceded by correct and error trials with intermediate coherence motion (prev-Correct and prev-Error). *p < 0.01 by paired t test. (D) Logistic regression analysis for the simulation data. The stimulus sequence and model parameters are taken from the data of the subject shown in Figure 1C .
(E) The bias effects in the experimental and simulation data, expressed by the equivalent change in motion coherence, shown separately for prev-Low and prev-Mid. See also Figure S3 .
We also constructed a model in which an internal estimate of the sensory signals is updated based on the actual sensory signals rather than sensory prediction errors (Model 8: SE n + 1 = SE n + aM n ) and another model in which an internal estimate of the choice likelihood is updated based on the actual choice rather than choice prediction errors (Model 9: CE n + 1 = CE n + aC n ). The fitting performance of the two models was no better than the Basic Model ( Figure 3A and Figure S3 ).
Model Simulation
We have also confirmed the validity of the choice likelihood estimation model by simulation. The model parameters for each of the 14 subjects were used, and the same sequence of sensory stimulus as in the behavioral experiment (RT2 dir) was used as an input to the model. As in the behavioral data, we found a significant increase in the choice repetition probability on zero coherence motion trials for prev-Low and prev-Mid than for prev-High (one-way ANOVA with factor of previous coherence: n = 15, ε = 0.74, F(1.49, 19.3) = 21.4, p < 0.001; post hoc test: p < 0.05) ( Figure 3B ). We also found an increase in the choice repetition probability on trials preceded by error trials than those preceded by correct trials (paired t test, t(13) = 4.17, p < 0.001) ( Figure 3C ). As for the binary logistic regression analysis, the regression curve was significantly shifted leftward for prev-Mid and prev-Low trials relative to prev-High (p < 0.05 for 10 and 13 out of 14 simulations for prev-Mid and prev-Low, respectively) ( Figure 3D ). The mean leftward shift of the regression curve was equivalent to 3.67% (95% confidence interval: 2.27-5.29) and 5.26% (3.47-7.26) change in motion coherence, respectively for prev-Mid and prev-Low (after exclusion of one outlier, with a value larger than 30%). By using the subject-specific model parameters and actual sensory signal strengths, the simulation has successfully replicated the magnitude of decision inertia in the experimental data for that particular subject. The decision-biasing effects of prev-Mid and prev-Low were significantly correlated between the experimental and simulation data (n = 13, one outlier data point was excluded from the analysis, Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient: r = 0.815 and 0.700, p = 0.001 and 0.08, respectively) ( Figure 3E ).
Model-Based fMRI Analysis
We next examined the neural mechanism for choice likelihood estimation. We conducted fMRI experiments while subjects performed RT2 dir task. Despite long ITI of 10-14 s in the fMRI experiment, the choice repetition probability on zero coherence motion trials was significantly higher for prev-Mid/Low trials than prev-High trials (n = 14, paired t test, two-tailed, t(13) = 3.77, p = 0.002). In the fMRI data, we identified regions in which activation time locked to the subjects' button press response significantly covaried with the trial-by-trial estimates of choice prediction error and updated choice estimate. Activation time locked to the stimulus onset was accounted for within the same model with parametric modulation according to the motion coherence level.
We found that activation in a region in the medial parietal cortex extending to the posterior cingulate cortex (mPC/CGp) was associated with choice prediction error on that trial (jC n -CE n j) ( Figure 4A ). The activation increased as the absolute magnitude of the choice prediction error increased. Activation in the putamen also covaried with the magnitude of choice prediction error, though with a subthreshold cluster size (Table S2 ). We also found that lower mPC/CGp activation, which reflects a smaller prediction error, was associated with an increase in the choice repetition probability when it was preceded by a trial with low coherence motion ( Figure 4A, right) . Two-way ANOVA on the choice repetition probability with factors of mPC/CGp activation (high and low) and previous motion coherence (prev-High and prev-Mid/Low) shows that there was a significant main effect of the mPC/CGp activation on the choice repetition probability (F(1, 13) = 5.65, p < 0.033), and a significant interaction between the previous motion coherence and mPC/CGp activation (F(1, 13) = 6.15, p = 0.028).
By contrast, activation in the right frontal eye field (FEF) was associated with the updated choice estimate (jCE n + a(C n -CE n )j) ( Figure 4B and Table S2 ). The activation was larger when the absolute value of the updated choice estimate was large. We also found that higher FEF activation, which reflects a larger value for the updated choice, was associated with an increase in the choice repetition probability for the subsequent trial ( Figure 4B , right). There was a significant main effect of the right FEF activation (high and low) on the choice repetition probability in the subsequent trial (F(1, 13) = 37.8, p < 0.001), and a significant interaction between the motion coherence (High and Mid/ Low) and right FEF activation (F(1, 13) = 9.15, p = 0.010).
Signal Transmission between FEF and mPC/CGp during Intertrial Interval
The information about the choice estimate represented in the mPC/CGp and the FEF needs to be updated and maintained during the ITI before biasing the decision on the subsequent trial. Decision making is carried out in multiregion network and it is likely that the biasing signals are updated and maintained by the state of the network involved in decision making. We therefore tested the possibility that the right FEF, which represented the magnitude of the choice bias, interacts with other regions during ITI and that the network state thus biased is responsible for the choice repetition on subsequent trials. A specific prediction was that the interaction between the FEF and other regions is larger during the ITI epochs following trials with intermediate or low coherence motion and also preceding trials in which subjects repeated the same choice as in the previous trial (Decision Inertia (+)) than the ITI epochs following trials with high coherence motion or ITI epochs preceding trials in which subject switched the choice from the previous trials (Decision Inertia (À)).
In the fMRI data, we found that during the Decision Inertia (+) ITI epochs, fluctuation in the right FEF activation was associated with a larger change in activation in the right mPC than during the Decision Inertia (À) ITI epochs ( Figure 4C , see also Table S3 ). Of note is that the region thus identified (peak coordinate: 3, À63, 54) is adjacent to the region in which the activation during decision process is associated with choice prediction error (9, À66, 39). Correlation of blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals between regions, however, does not necessarily indicate direct connections between the two regions: the correlation can be due to common inputs from a third region. Also because of the delay in hemodynamic response, the correlation of BOLD signals may reflect interregional interactions during decision making epochs rather than during ITIs.
To examine whether the interaction with the FEF at a certain time point during the ITI is associated with decision inertia, we examined corticocortical signal transmission induced by FEF stimulation (Morishima et al., 2009; Akaishi et al., 2010) . We gave a low-intensity single-pulse TMS (80% of the active motor threshold) over the right FEF during ITIs and recorded TMSevoked potentials using EEG ( Figure 5A ). Here we used TMS as a probe to examine the functional state of the neural network without causing changes in behavior. In fact, TMS did not affect the biasing effect of previous decisions on ambiguous stimuli (Table S4) Table S5 for location of nondifferential induced activation). Two-way repeated-measures ANOVA on the induced activation in the mPC/CGp showed a significant main effect of motion coherence of the preceding trial (prev-Mid/Low or prev-High) (F(1, 16) = 14.3, p = 0.002) and also a significant interaction between previous motion coherence and choice repetition in the subsequent trial (choice repeat or switch) (F(1, 16) = 5.7, p = 0.029). The results suggest that the efficacy of signal transmission from the right FEF to mPC/CGp is increased after decision making on ambiguous stimuli and that this change in signal transmission is associated with choice repetition bias (see Figures S4E-S4I and Table S6 for signal transmission from parietal region to FEF). This mPC/CGp region (peak coordinate: 5, À65, 45) is close to the region in which activation covaried with the magnitude of a choice prediction error in the fMRI experiment (9, À66, 39).
DISCUSSION
We found that a decision based on little sensory evidence tends to be repeated on subsequent trials. Contrary to the view that trial history effects on decision processes are due to a bias on response generation or sensory processing, this decision inertia cannot be accounted for by response bias, sensory bias, or attention bias. We instead show that the decision inertia is best accounted for by an autonomous learning mechanism of estimating the likelihood of a choice to be made. Here we use the term ''choice'' as distinct from action and, in the context of perceptual decision making in the present study, a choice is operationally defined as an act of selecting one of the two alternative perceptual reports in a given sensory context independent of the motor response (Schall, 2001) . The choice estimate, on the other hand, can be taken to reflect the belief about the sensory state, which biases the choice. This belief is updated for every trial based on the choice prediction error, that is, the discrepancy between the actual choice and choice likelihood estimate.
In value-guided decision making, an estimate of the state or action value is compared with the state/action value determined by reward or feedback about the state change (Samejima and Doya, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008) . However, a choice history effect has been reported in matching behavior as well as in perceptual decision making even when the reward or outcome history effect has been covaried out: the effect has been accounted for by a weighted sum of the biasing effect of the previous choices (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Gold et al., 2008) . Here we have shown that the choice history effect can be mediated by an autonomous learning mechanism to update the choice likelihood estimate based on the choice itself. In our model, the actual choice itself serves as a feedback, with which the choice estimate is compared and updated. The choice estimate thus updated biases the decision on subsequent trials toward the direction of the previous choice, especially when the previous decision is made on an ambiguous stimulus. The idea that the choice itself updates the estimate of choice may seem counterintuitive. However, a similar idea of a choice-induced change in choice preference has been reported in the literature of cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Izuma and Murayama, 2013) . The phenomenon can be regarded as updating of the choice preference for a particular item based on the actual choice made for that item, which leads to an increase in the probability of choosing the same item on the next occasion. It seems that when no outcome information is provided externally, the decision system relies more on internal information such as choice likelihood estimates and the choices that have been made.
The adaptive mechanism of updating the choice estimate is similar to the RL or other outcome-based mechanisms in value-guided decision making. The information used for updating differs, however. While a decision outcome is used for updating the action/state value in value-guided decision making, an actual choice that the subject has made seems to be used for updating the choice estimate in perceptual decision making without performance feedback. We observed an increment of the choice repetition probability according to the number of repeated choices in the preceding trials and almost complete disappearance of this tendency by just a single choice switch made in the last trial ( Figure 1E ). This pattern of behavior is consistent with our computational model based on the choicebased prediction error. The pattern can also be consistent with a Baysian change point detection model, in which an internal state of the system is completely reset upon encounter with a change in the environmental structures (Adams and MacKay, 2007; Nassar et al., 2010) . The choice, in this scenario, reflects the change in the belief about the environmental state.
We also found similarities in the neural mechanism between learning of a choice estimate and reward-based RL. The mPC/ CGp region that we have shown to represent choice prediction error is also shown to be involved in reward-based decision making: neurons in the CGp are shown to respond most strongly to reward that deviated from the maximum reward obtainable (Hayden et al., 2008) . It is also shown that the firing rate of CGp neurons predicted switching to the alternative option on the next trial after receiving large reward for a risky choice (Hayden et al., 2008; Pearson et al., 2011) . Crucially, the neural activity reflected choice switch even when the reward-related variance was accounted for. We in fact found that activation in the mPC/CGp is larger when choice switch occurs ( Figure 4A ). Furthermore, choice-induced changes in the preference are associated with activation in the CGp (Izuma et al., 2010; Jarcho et al., 2011; Kitayama et al., 2013) , supporting the idea that this region is involved in choice-based updating of the choice likelihood estimate. Alternatively, the CGp may be involved in updating the belief about the environmental state (Pearson et al., 2011) . Our finding that the FEF represents the updated choice estimate is also consistent with neurophysiological studies showing representation of a reward estimate of the past and current state by prefrontal neurons (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Kobayashi et al., 2002; Barraclough et al., 2004) . It has also been reported that FEF neurons show an activity pattern that reflects the choice and sensory strength even after reward delivery (Ding and Gold, 2012) . The activity can be interpreted as coding the choice made in a specific sensory context, which may then be communicated to the mPC/CGp to calculate the choice-based prediction error. We in fact found an increase in the interaction of BOLD signals and in the efficacy of TMS-induced signal transmission between the FEF and mPC/CGp during ITI that precedes trials with decision inertia. The mPC is anatomically connected with both the FEF and CGp (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Margulies et al., 2009) , and it could be that the interaction between the FEF and CGp is mediated via mPC. We suggest that the neural interaction between the FEF and mPC/CGp may reflect transfer of information about the actual choice and choice-based prediction error and is involved in updating and maintenance of the internal signals responsible for the decision inertia.
The mechanism of choice likelihood estimation does not seem to be useful for producing optimal behavioral in the present task. Yet, the neural system computes an estimate of the choice to be made using the actual choice to adjust the estimate, regardless of whether that choice is correct or not. Nonoptimal tendency to repeat the same decision has also been observed in a status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) , confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) , and perceptual memory for an ambiguous stimulus (Leopold et al., 2002; Pearson and Brascamp, 2008) . Unlike reward-based RL (Matsumoto et al., 2007; Ide et al., 2013) , activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was not associated with choice prediction error in the present study. It could be that nonreward-based updating of the choice estimate involves only a part of the reward-based RL mechanism. Such interpretation is plausible given that the projections conveying the reward outcome are rich in the ACC but relatively sparse in mPC/CGp (Amaral and Price, 1984; Berger et al., 1988) . One interesting possibility is that the RL mechanism is built upon the choice-based learning mechanism. When reward is given after a decision in this scheme, the reward information is used to learn a decision-reward contingency within a circuit consisted of ACC and basal ganglia, which then influences choices through a choice-based learning mechanism that involves the CGp. In fact, microstimulation of the CGp, which also represents value information, increased the probability of a choice switch (Hayden et al., 2008) . Thus, the network we identified in the present study, especially the CGp, might play an important role in translating the reward information to the implementation of choice. In the future studies, it is interesting to see how this autonomous mechanism of updating choice estimate interacts with reward-based and sensory-state-based learning mechanisms.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES Subjects
Fourteen human subjects participated in the behavioral experiment using RT2 dir (mean age 27.1; range 20-46). Eleven subjects performed DR2 dir-MAP (mean age 26.5; range 19-47). Twenty subjects performed RT2 dir-IVS (mean age 25.4; range 19-46) . Fifteen subjects performed RT2 dir-Overlaid (mean age 25.3; range 20-47). Additionally 14 subjects participated in the fMRI experiment (mean age 23.4; range 20-31), and 17 subjects participated in the TMS-EEG experiments (mean age 25.5, range 19-42) . None of the subjects were taking any medicine and none had prior history of neuropsychiatric disorders. Informed consents were obtained from all subjects prior to the experiment. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Graduate School of Medicine, the University of Tokyo.
Behavioral Paradigm
Subjects sat on a chair with their head fixed on a chin rest and watched a monitor at a distance of 57 cm. The stimuli were white random dot motion pat- In RT2 dir, two white disc-shaped stimuli (choice target) were presented on both sides of the monitor simultaneously with the random dot motion pattern. Subjects pressed one of two buttons with the right index or middle finger depending on whether the subjects perceived the stimulus as moving left-or rightward. The random dot motion pattern and choice targets disappeared when subjects made button press within 2 s of stimulus onset or when 2 s elapsed without button press. ITI was varied from 1,350 to 1,650 ms, during which subjects kept fixating at a white cross at the center of screen. The direction of motion and motion coherence level were pseudorandomized within an experimental session; 73 trials 3 12 sessions were given.
In DR2 dir-MAP, subjects performed a delayed-response version of the task with a stimulus-response mapping cue, which was consisted of left-and rightward pointing arrows, each of which was presented above or below the fixation cross. The two response buttons were arranged vertically and subjects pressed upper and lower buttons with the right middle and index fingers, respectively. Subjects indicated their decision by pressing the button that corresponds to the position of the arrow (upper or lower) pointing to the direction of perceived motion. The arrangement of the two arrows changed pseudorandomly across trials such that on half of the trials subjects had to use the index finger for the righward motion and, on another half, use the middle finger; 73 trials 3 18 sessions were given.
In RT2 dir-IVS, a random dot motion pattern with coherence level of 51.2% was presented throughout the ITI (2,850 to 3,150 ms) of RT2 dir. A target motion stimulus to which subjects had to make a decision can easily be distinguished from the intervening motion stimulus by the presence of two choice targets (two white discs). The direction of the motion of the intervening stimulus was either to the left or right; 73 3 10 trials were given.
In RT2 dir-Overlaid, subjects performed an RT version of two-direction motion discrimination task for overlaid red and green random dot patterns. Subjects indicated the perceived direction of coherent motion of the red or green dots based on a cue presented 1,000 ms before the onset of a visual target. The motion coherence level was varied at three levels (0%, 38.4%, and 76.8%) across trials, independently between the two colors. The direction of motion was also chosen pseudorandomly and independently between the two colors; 73 3 12 trials were given.
For the fMRI experiment, we used RT2 dir task with ITI varying from 10 to 14 s; 37 trials 3 5 sessions were given. For the TMS-EEG experiments, we used RT2 dir task with ITI varying from 1,700 to 2,000 ms; 73 trials 3 18 sessions were given.
Neuron Decision Inertia Due to Choice Estimate
Behavioral Data Analysis The choice data were analyzed using binary logistic regression. For each subject, the choice repetition probability, P, was given by
where M curr is the motion coherence in the current trial expressed in percentage and was given a positive or negative sign when the motion direction on that trial was the same as or different from the previous choice direction. M prev is an index variable and was assigned a value of 1 when motion coherence on the previous trial was 0% or 3.2% (prev-Low), or 6.4% or 12.8% (prev-Mid), and a value of 0 when motion coherence on the previous trial was 25.6% or 51.2% (prev-High). The b i are free parameters and were estimated using the maximum likelihood method. b 2 with an odds ratio significantly larger than 1 indicates a significant effect of prev-Low or prev-Mid relative to prev-High. The ratio of b 2 to b 1 provides an estimate of the effect size expressed in equivalent motion coherence (%): a change in the motion coherence on the current trial by the amount of this value in prev-High would result in the same size of an effect on choice repetition probability as prev-Low or prev-Mid (Hanks et al., 2006) . We used repeated-measures ANOVA for statistical tests. When conducting ANOVA with a factor of more than two levels, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (epsilon, ε) for all cases.
Model Fitting
We first built Basic Model, whereby the probability of making a choice indicating rightward motion direction (P) is determined by the following equation:
where the decision variable at nth trial (DV n ) is determined by the following equation:
The motion signals at the nth trial, M n , takes a value from À51.2 (strong leftward motion) to +51.2 (strong rightward motion), and the decision variable is determined by the motion signals multiplied by a free parameter of sensitivity to motion signals (s). The model also takes into account the general bias to make a certain choice (b), a tendency to repeat the same choice as in the previous trial (g), and the magnitude of an aftereffect of motion signals in the previous trial (l). The choice at the nth trial, C n , takes a binary value of either À1 or +1 (left or right choice). b takes a positive value if right-direction choices are more prevalent and vice versa and its magnitude is scaled according to other parameters. g takes a positive value if there is a tendency to repeat the previous choice and takes a negative value if there is a tendency to switch from the previous choice to the other choice. l takes a positive value if there are more choices to the same direction as the motion direction in the previous trial.
This Basic Model does not take into account the modulation of the decision bias depending on the motion coherence level of the previous trial. We therefore created five models (Models 1-5) in which each term in the decision variable is multiplied by a modulator variable, g:
g is a function of the absolute value of the previous motion coherence, jM n-1 j, with a tuning parameter, h, which determines the slope of the modulator variable against the motion coherence. As can be seen in the equation, weak motion signal makes the modulator variable larger. In Model 1, the sensitivity to motion signals (s) is modulated by the previous motion coherence:
In Model 3, the general choice bias (b) is modulated by the previous motion coherence:
In Model 4, the tendency of repeating the previous choice (g) is modulated by the previous motion coherence:
In Model 5, the magnitude of the motion aftereffect (l) is modulated by the previous motion coherence:
Model 2 is a variant of Model 1 in which the sensitivity to motion signals (s) is modulated in different manners depending on whether current motion direction is the same as or opposite to the previous choice direction:
where the modulator variable, g 0 , is defined as
We also constructed models (Models 6 and 7) in which an estimate of the sensory signals to be presented (SE n ) or of the likely choice to be made (CE n ) is added to the decision variable.
In Model 6, an estimate of the probable sensory signals (sensory estimate, SE n ) is included in the decision variable. SE n takes a value from À51.2 to 51.2, thus accounting for both motion direction and motion strength:
where u is a free parameter that determines the contribution of the estimate to the decision variable. The estimate is assumed to be updated with an RL-like mechanism as in the following equation:
where a is a learning parameter.
In Model 7, by contrast, an estimate of a probable choice to be made (choice estimate, CE n ) is included in the decision variable. CE n takes a value from À1 to 1 (a value closer to 1 indicates higher likelihood of the rightward choice). The estimate was assumed to be updated based on the difference from the actual choice (C n ), which takes a value of either 1 or À1:
CE n + 1 = CE n + aðC n À CE n Þ:
In addition, we constructed two models, in which an estimate is updated based on actual sensory signals (Model 8: SE n + 1 = SE n + aM n ) or choice per se (Model 9: CE n + 1 = CE n + aC n ) rather than based on prediction errors.
The models were fitted to the behavioral data for the RT2 dir for each of the 14 subjects, and the free parameters of the model were estimated by maximizing the likelihoods with Nelder-Mead downhill simplex optimization method. Fitting was repeated for 20 times with different sets of initial values. The values of the estimated parameters were stable across initial values.
fMRI Experiment
Imaging was performed using a 3 tesla scanner (Trio A Tim; Siemens). We acquired 234 volumes of images sensitive to BOLD contrasts within a session and conducted five sessions. After preprocessing, each trial was modeled as a stick function time-locked to the onset of visual stimuli, which was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). We also modeled parametric modulation according to the motion coherence level of the stimulus. Another stick function regressor time locked to the button press was included in the model, with parametric modulator variables representing the trial-by-trial estimate for choice prediction error and updated choice estimate. As nuisance regressors, we entered the RT for each trial in order to covary out the effect of the duration of visual stimul, and six dimensions of head motion parameters to remove head motion artifacts. Images of parameter estimates were created for each subject and were then entered into a second-level analysis using a one-sample t test across the 14 subjects. Height threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected and cluster size threshold of p < 0.05 corrected were used. See Supplemental Information for detail.
We then tested whether the amount of activation in regions identified as above (FEF and mPC/CGp) can be predictive of the decision inertia. We estimated the neural activity in these regions by deconvolving the HRF from the BOLD signal time series (Gitelman et al., 2003 ). For each motion coherence level and for each scanning session, we categorized trials into halves depending on whether there was higher or lower activity relative to the median. We tested the effect of activation (high or low) and its interaction with the motion coherence on the choice repetition probability.
For the analysis of psychophysiological interaction during ITI, we calculated the product of time course of estimated neural activity in the right FEF and the vector of the psychological variable, which was determined as a box-car function corresponding to ITI epoch, with weighting of 1 for Decision Inertia (+) and À1 for Decision Inertia (À). For each subject, a general linear model was computed, which includes, as regressors, the interaction term, the time series of BOLD signals in the FEF, and the psychological variable. Phasic activation time locked to the onset of visual stimulus was covaried out by including a stick function regressor at visual stimulus onset with parametric modulation depending on motion coherence level, which was convolved with HRF.
TMS-EEG Experiment
On 36 trials randomly chosen from 73 trials in each session, we gave a singlepulse TMS over the right FEF at 500 ms before the presentation of a random dot motion pattern. TMS was applied with a figure-of-eight coil with a diameter of 70 mm and Magstim 200 stimulator (Magstim). The position of the coil was determined based on the surface brain image of the structural MRI for each subject using Brainsight (Rogue Research). We simultaneously recorded EEG with 60 electrodes using a TMS-compatible amplifier (BrainAmp, Brain Products GmbH) (sampling rate: 2,500 Hz with 16 bit resolution). We used sLORETA (Pascual-Marqui, 2002) for estimation of the cortical distribution of current source density (CSD) that accounts for the scalp distribution of TMS-evoked potentials (TMS-EPs). For each subject at each time point of the local peaks of global-field power (GFP) within 60 ms of stimulation, CSD map was created separately for Decision Inertia (+) and Decision Inertia (À) ITI epochs. The logarithmically transformed CSD values for each voxel of the MNI space were compared between the two ITI epoch types in a pairwise manner. We used a nonparametric permutation test with a threshold of p < 0.05 corrected for multiple voxels based on 5,000 randomizations (one tailed). See Supplemental Information for detail.
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